



VOTERS AND THE NEW INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- **WHY HAVE INDONESIAN VOTERS VOTED AS THEY HAVE IN THREE PARLIAMENTARY AND TWO DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1999, 2004, AND 2009?**
- **WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE PATTERNS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR FOR THE QUALITY OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY?**

THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

SIX NATIONAL LSI OPINION SURVEYS: ONE IN 1999, THREE IN 2004, TWO IN 2009.

FACTORS EXAMINED:

**SOCIOLOGICAL (RELIGION/ALIRAN,
REGION/ETHNICITY, SOCIAL CLASS)**

LEADERS/CANDIDATES

PARTY ID

MEDIA CAMPAIGN (2009)

INCUMBENT'S PERFORMANCE

Parties in post-transition democratic Indonesian parliamentary elections: percent of votes (and seats)


PARTIES	1999 votes (seats)	2004 votes (seats)	2009 votes (seats)
PDIP	34 (33)	18.5 (20)	14 (17)
GOLKAR	22 (26)	22 (23)	14 (19)
PKB	13 (11)	11 (10)	5 (5)
PPP	11 (13)	8 (11)	5 (7)
PAN	7 (7)	6 (10)	6 (8)
PK/PKS	2	7 (8)	8 (10)
DEMOKRAT	-	7 (10)	21 (26)
GERINDRA	-	-	5 (5)
HANURA	-	-	4 (3)
<i>OTHER</i>	14 (8)	20 (9)	28 (-)
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0

Vote for presidents/vice-presidents in democratic Indonesian elections 2004-2009 (%)


President-Vice President Pairs	2004 First Round	2004 Second Round	2009
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono- Jusuf Kalla (2004); Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono- Boediono (2009)	34	61	61
Megawati Sukarnoputri- Hasyim Muzadi (2004); Megawati Sukarnoputri- Prabowo Subianto (2009)	26	39	27
Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid (2004); Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto (2009)	24		12
Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusodo	14		
Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar	5		

FINDINGS


Party vote according to Muslim religiosity, April 09 (%) (not in paper)




Presidential vote according to Muslim religiosity, July 09 (%) (not in paper)




Party vote according to Java versus other islands, April 09 (%) (not in paper)



**Figure 1. Mean score of likeability of party leader
(1 = liked the least, 10 = liked the most)**



**Figure 2a. Is there any party you feel close to? (%)
(not in paper)**



**Figure 2b. Feel close to a certain party
(Party ID). Trend 2003-2009 (%) (not in paper)**






Figure 2. Mean score of feeling close to a particular party (1 = not close at all, 4 = very close)



Exposed to social and political information via ..., April 2009 (%) (Comparable to Table 1 in paper)



Campaign exposure and party advertisements most often seen, read or heard about via ..., April 2009 (%) (Comparable to Table 2 in paper)




Figure 3. Campaign exposure and candidate advertisements most often seen, read or heard about via ..., July 2009 (%)




Figure 4. Association between following a campaign and party advertisements on TV and choosing that party, April 2009 (%)




Figure 5. Association between most often exposed to TV candidate advertisements and voting for those candidates, July 2009 (%)




Figure 6. Evaluation of national economic condition this year compared to last year (%)




Figure 6a. Trend: Evaluation of national economic condition this year compared to last year (%) (not in paper)




Figure 7. National economic condition and voting for incumbent (PD) and opposition (PDIP/Gerindra) parties (%)




Figure 8. National economic condition and voting for president/vice-president (%)




Table 3. Governmental performance in... (%)

		Very good	Good	Bad	Very bad	Don't know
Reducing poverty	April 2009	3.9	48.4	39.2	5.0	3.5
	July 2009	3.0	54.1	34.5	4.7	2.7
Reducing unemployment	April 2009	2.6	41.1	46.3	6.0	4.1
	July 2009	3.1	51.3	37.7	5.3	2.6
Stabilizing prices of basic commodities	April 2009	4.7	59.2	31.8	2.9	1.3
	July 2009	7.2	61.4	26.9	3.3	1.2
Health	April 2009	7.4	78.2	11.2	.6	2.5
	July 2009	6.6	77.9	12.7	1.5	1.3
Education	April 2009	9	78.1	9.1	.2	3.7
	July 2009	8.8	77.7	11.2	.7	1.6

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS I

2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION:

LEADER APPEAL, CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY MOST HELP TO EXPLAIN PARTISAN CHOICES BY VOTERS.

DIRECT EFFECT OF LEADER APPEAL CLEAR IN TABLE 4. DISAPPEARANCE OF DIRECT EFFECT OF MEDIA CAMPAIGN CAUSED BY CLOSENESS IN VOTER PERCEPTION OF MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND LEADER LIKEABILITY, AND ALSO OF MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS II

2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

CAMPAIGN MEDIA EFFECT SIGNIFICANT REGARDLESS OF LEADER LIKEABILITY, PARTY ID AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

***POSSIBLE EXPLANATION:* STRONG NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CLAIMS AND ATTACKS MADE DURING CAMPAIGN.**

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS III

IN BOTH ELECTIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IMPORTANT, BUT LESS THAN IN 1999 AND 2004:

MUSLIM RELIGIOSITY—SIGNIFICANT FOR PKB RELATIVE TO PD AND PDIP.

REGION (JAVA VERSUS OTHER ISLANDS)—SIGNIFICANT FOR GOLKAR RELATIVE TO PD, PKB, AND PDIP.

AGE, URBAN-RURAL, GENDER—YOUNGER RURAL MALES TENDED TO VOTE FOR KALLA RELATIVE TO SBY. *POSSIBLE EXPLANATION:* KALLA MORE OPEN, SPONTANEOUS, ON ATTACK, SBY MORE CONTROLLED, AUTHORITATIVE IN CAMPAIGN ADVERTISEMENTS.

IMPLICATIONS

FIVE IMPLICATIONS

(1) INDONESIAN VOTERS ARE RATIONAL.

- THEY HAVE GOALS, EXPECT LEADERS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THOSE GOALS, CHOOSE PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN THOSE TERMS.**
- POSITIVE FOR DEMOCRACY.**

(2) UNATTRACTIVENESS OF PARTIES BASED ON RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC IDENTITIES ALSO POSITIVE FOR DEMOCRACY.

FIVE IMPLICATIONS

(3) LACK OF SOCIAL CLASS BASIS FOR PARTIES HAS MIXED IMPLICATIONS:

CLASS DIFFERENCES A NORMAL BASIS OF PARTY DIFFERENCES IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES, WITH USUALLY POSITIVE EFFECTS.

BUT CLASS CONFLICT CAN BE POLARIZING, AS EARLIER IN INDONESIAN HISTORY WITH DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES.

(4) INDEPENDENT IMPACT OF TV CAMPAIGNS ALSO MIXED:

POSITIVE: VALUABLE INFORMATION BASIC TO DEMOCRACY.

NEGATIVE: INEQUALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING DISTORTS RESULTS.

FIVE IMPLICATIONS

(5) DYSFUNCTIONAL PARTY SYSTEM INIMICAL TO DEMOCRACY.

WEAKNESSES:

- (a) TOO FRAGMENTED (FIVE, THEN SEVEN, THEN NINE PARTIES WITH MORE THAN 3% OF THE POPULAR VOTE SINCE 1999).**
- (b) TOO VOLATILE.**
- (c) TOO MUCH TOP-DOWN CONTROL IN MOST PARTIES.**
- (d) NO TRADITION OF PARTY ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE ELECTORATE.**

A SIDE-EFFECT OF A BETTER-FUNCTIONING PRESIDENCY?

CONCLUSIONS

EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS (FROM SURVEY)

WHY HAVE INDONESIANS VOTED AS THEY HAVE?

1999/2004: SUPPORT FOR LEADERS AND PARTIES.

2009: STILL LEADERS AND PARTIES, BUT ALSO INFLUENCED BY MEDIA CAMPAIGNS, PERCEPTION OF THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, EVALUATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE.

QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY CONCLUSIONS I

POSITIVE:

- 1. IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, CLOSE ALIGNMENT BETWEEN VOTER PREFERENCES, ELECTION RESULTS, AND GOVERNMENT POLICY OUTCOMES.**
- 2. LOW PRIORITY TO ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS POLITICS.**

NEGATIVE:

**PERPETUATION OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL PARTY SYSTEM:
TOO MANY PARTIES, TOO MUCH VOLATILITY, TOO LITTLE
INTERNAL DEMOCRACY, TOO MANY PERSONALISTIC
LEADERS, TOO LITTLE RESPONSIVENESS TO THE
ELECTORATE.**

QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY CONCLUSIONS II

CONSEQUENCES OF THIS COMBINATION OF A FUNCTIONAL PRESIDENCY AND DYSFUNCTIONAL PARTY SYSTEM?

2009-2014—STABLE, POSSIBLY MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (MORE POLITICAL RESOURCES FOR PRESIDENT, INCLUDING LARGE GOVERNING COALITION).

BUT ALSO POSSIBLY LESS RESPONSIVE (E.G., ON CORRUPTION ISSUES), ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS GRAND COALITION INCLUDING GOLKAR AND PDIP.

2014—SYSTEM MAY HAVE BECOME TOO DEPENDENT ON *FORTUNA* IN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT WITHOUT A WELL-ROOTED PARTY SYSTEM.