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**Chinese Civil Society Organisations from the comparative perspective:
Civil Society Organisations Research (JIGS)
6-country comparison**

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1. Introduction

In this keynote presentation, I am going to compare the Chinese social organizations' (*shetuan*) data and the civil society organisations data of other countries as far as is possible in this point of time, focusing on the questions all the surveys have in common, in order to understand and describe the inner structure of Chinese politics and society.

First, I'm going to introduce the outline of the international research, its characteristics and the significance of the social organizations' research in China.

1.1. The outline of the civil society organisations research

To understand the nature and direction of the Chinese social organizations, which constitute one part of the Chinese civil society organisations, I formed a research team funded with the Ministry of Education and Science research grant and a questionnaire survey in Beijing, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang from 2001 to 2004 was conducted with the collaborative initiative of the Peking University, Institute of Political Development and Governance, Centre for Civil Society Studies¹.

This survey is one part of the international survey of civil society and interest groups (hereafter JIGS, which originally stands for *Japan Interest Group Survey*), which was started 1997 and by now has been done on eight countries: Japan (1997), South-Korea (1997), the US (1999), Germany (2000), Russia and Turkey (2004), Philippines (2004-2005), and we are working on the Brazilian survey for 2005-2006.²

For the Chinese survey, the questionnaires were sent by mail, targeting among the social organizations registered in every administrative level, all of the social organizations in Beijing city and half of the Zhejiang and Heilongjiang provinces' associations. The survey was conducted from December 2001 to February 2004, and the number of valid returns for Beijing was 627 (35%), Zhejiang 1782 (35%) and Heilongjiang 449 (23%).

1.2. The characteristics of the Chinese survey

Using the JIGS survey data for six countries mentioned above (excluding Turkey and Philippines), I'm making an attempt to compare Chinese social organizations with the other countries' civil society organisations. Needless to say, the Chinese social

organizations are not quite the same as the civil society organisations of the other countries, therefore some reservations are needed.³ The six-country comparison uses the data of the capital cities. Additionally, the comparison within the Chinese three areas is introduced.

The following points have to be considered when comparing Chinese data with that of other countries. **1) Narrower scope of surveyed objects: “social organizations”.** In the case of other countries, the aim is to grasp the civil society organisations as a whole, and so the telephone directories by occupation (or the comprehensive lists equivalent to these) were used as the population for the survey. In the Chinese survey, it was the organizations officially registered by the local (municipal, provincial *etc.*) governments. Namely, the JIGS data include the data of official as well as unofficial organizations, but the Chinese data include only the groups that are registered. **2) Exclusion of nationwide social organizations:** being closely related to the (1) point, we surveyed the social organizations that are registered by local authorities, *i.e.* the groups classified as nationwide are not included. As the organizations, which are active nationwide, are closely related to the Party and the Government, we considered it better to exclude them from the survey at this point of time. Moreover, these nationwide groups account for about 1% of the social organizations. **3) A high return rate due to the cooperation of the official authorities.** The return rate was relatively high as we were able to work together with the local governments. The outcome was comparable to the JIGS survey highest response rates – the Japanese survey with Tokyo’s 37.2% and Ibaraki’s 51.7%. **4) Wide-ranging subject questions and high response rate.** Compared to Japanese survey (with its 36 main subject questions for example), the Chinese survey questionnaires include more detailed and delicate subjects (65 main subjects, 15 pages of A4), have generally high response rate and the responses are estimated to have a high reliability.

1.3. The significance of the Chinese survey.

Keeping in mind its differences and special characteristics, we find the Chinese survey very important as a civil society organisations survey with its fixed limits.⁴ But before explaining the significance of the survey, I would like to examine the limitations posed by the definitions of social organizations.

As explained above, this survey includes only the official organisations that are registered by the local authorities. The position of the nationwide social organizations is hardly independent due to their close ties with the official authorities and the party, and further, they are statistically possible to ignore as they account for only 1%.

Now, let us have a closer look of what are those registered social organizations. They are one kind of NPOs (associations, academic societies, fraternities, trade organisations *etc.*), formed on Chinese people’s own initiative, with the purpose of accomplishing common interests of its members. They are operating under *the Social Organisations’ Registration Regulations law* (promulgated and effective from September 1998), according to which the registration at the local authorities is obligatory.

Beside the social organizations, there are also private non-business units as registered nongovernmental NPOs. Business units, social organizations or private citizens provide non-profit social services through these organisations, using private assets. They used to be registered as business units, but from the spring 2000, they were re-registered according to the *Provisional Private Non-business Units' Registration Regulations* (promulgated and effective from October 1998).⁵ Similar non-profit social service organizations are mostly excluded also in the International JIGS.

According to the same regulations, there are social organizations that are not entitled to be registered. These are the following three categories: 1) the people's organizations that are taking part in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; 2) the government recognized organizations that have been exempted from the registration by the decision of the State Council of China; 3) the groups, which are formed in the category of organisations, associations and corporations and which are operating within the framework of this category. The last mentioned are internal (sub-category) organisations.

In short, there are two types of civil non-profit organisations that are entitled to be registered (the social organizations and the private non-business units); and besides there are official social organizations like people's organizations and government recognised social organizations. Namely, the organizations that since 1950 have been taking part in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, whose members are government officials, who can be considered as a part of the government and thus are exempt from the registration. These include organisations such as All China Federation of Industry and Commerce, National Federation of Women's Organisations, All China Federation of Trade Unions, All China Youth Federation, Science and Technology Association, Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese *etc.* Further, the social organizations recognised by the State Council of China such as the Red Cross Society of China, Chinese Jurisprudence Academy, Chinese Writers Association *etc.* are also exempt from registration.⁶ This goes as a general rule, namely at all the administrative levels *the centre federation* of women's organisations, the youth organisations, labour unions, major academic institutes, culture and arts associations, centres for foreign associations *etc.*, are checked by the Party/Government, therefore there is no need for them to register.

Actually, in present day China there are *a number of private non-profit nongovernmental organisations that are not registered* in addition to those which are officially exempted from registration. However, due to the low reliability of the telephone directories and the instability of the groups, the actual survey of those groups was too problematic. These groups are either restricted from being registered or they refrain from the registration in order to avoid inconveniences for their activities. In reality, they are contributing to the activities alleviating the environmental and poverty issues, women's rights, education problems *etc.* At the same time, the sphere of activities of these very groups that are outside the framework of the official social organizations, attract scholars' attention in and outside China as the true sprout of civil society.⁷ Thus, with these considerations, we didn't include this sort of associations into

our data this time, but we are planning to do so for the Second JIGS (scheduled for 2007).

Similarly, villagers committees, autonomous residents' groups like neighbourhood communities, farmers' economic associations *etc.* as non-registered groups, are not included into the survey. However, in the first International JIGS, autonomous residents' organisations are not fully represented either, and further, private non-profit groups are mostly excluded.

The number of the private non-profit organizations, that the social organizations represent, increased rapidly reaching over 180 thousand in the second half of the 1980s due to the administrative reforms aiming market economy, small government and big society (welfare programs). However, as the dealings of sham governmental sector, nepotistic institutions and concealed finances started to stick out, the illegal associations were revealed and regulated, and their number decreased gradually starting mid-1990s. By 2001, the number had fallen below 130 thousand, but thereafter it showed an increase again, so that by the end of 2004 the number has recovered to 153 thousand⁸.

Of the 153 359 social organizations, there are 1673 (1.1%) nationwide; 20 563 (13.4%) provincial; 50 424 (32.9%) prefectural and most remarkably 80 699 (52.6%) county level organisations. Classified functionally, there are 46 370 (30.2%) business related associations; 37 899 (24.7%) art and scientific associations; 44 322 (28.9%) professional associations; 21 790 (14.2%) federations; 54 (0.03%) foreign trade corporations and others account for 2924 (1.9%).⁹

The *Social Organisations' Registration Regulations* (1998) stipulate the following. To establish a public association there must be at least 50 individual members or at least 30 organisational members, must employ full time staff at some permanent establishment and have in the case of nationwide associations over 100 thousand yuan, in the case of regional associations over 30 thousand yuan worth of assets. The established associations have to submit an application at the registration management office after completing inspections by respective supervision department inspection. Similar groups are not recognised within one administrative unit¹⁰ (actually, as our survey revealed, these conditions may not be followed too strictly).

In Japan with the population of one tenth of China's, there are 13 thousand social organization corporations ("Shadan-hojin", official public corporation licensed by competent authority in the national government or prefecture governments), 40 thousand associations as an establishment with full time employee, 200 thousand associations categorised by occupation in the telephone directory¹¹, and still they have similar official and divisional limitations. Therefore, we can assume that the Chinese social organizations are at least now the most comprehensive and practical target for a civil society organisations' survey. Further, from the International JIGS point of view, the targeted groups correspond in their categories as well as in essence almost perfectly. However, considering the official registration and the qualification regulations, we expect the Chinese social organizations to stand between Japanese social organization corporations and associations as an establishment.

After confirming that despite some limitations the Chinese social organizations are comparable, I would now like to examine the significance of the study on the social organizations.

When making inferences about civil society organisations, we have to keep in mind that the social organizations constitute but one part of the Chinese private non-profit organisations' sphere of operation. They are of the world, where the public and private are intermingled in today's China – they are considered private as their members are not public officials (in contrast to people's organizations and government recognised social organizations), at the same time they are very official and possibly influenced strongly by the Party or the Government. Nevertheless, we can say that the social organizations survey compose a crucial comparison material. **Due to their position in the socio-political structure, we may assume their statist character; therefore, if we manage to single out their pluralism and civil society character, then the guess that the same characteristics can be found in other spheres as well, will be justified (the verification of the growing civil society character).**

When comparing the Chinese social organizations with the civil society organisations of the other countries, the Chinese plurality and civil society character are not the only focus. Between China and the other five countries we can compare today – Japan, South-Korea, the US, Germany and Russia – there are certain common features, and some decisive differences beginning with the political structure, for example (let's compare China vs. U.S., China vs. Russia, and/or China vs. Japan etc.). Further, in China, we are surveying three very different areas, and that makes it possible to compare these areas with each other. From this comparison, we can draw more **universal inferences on the significance of the civil society organisations within a society of a different political structure; on the difference of the structure and its influences; and further, on the universal qualities of the civil society organisations that overcome these disparities (exploring universal hypothesis).**¹²

Saying strictly, this paper is the first preparatory analysis on China using the original systematic JIGS data, as well as it is just **a descriptive account on the comparative data** itself.


2. The resources and the foundation year of the Chinese social organizations: six country comparison

In this paragraph, I'm going to compare relatively simply the main subject questions of the six countries' surveys, without any substantial data processing¹³. Due to the limited space, I left out many tables and figures (see the power point slides).

2.1. The foundation year of the Chinese social organizations

The formation of the social organizations in China (Beijing) is very similar to that of Russia (Moscow) peaking in 1990s, as Figure 1 indicates. Also South-Korea and Germany experienced remarkable systematic changes around 1990s, therefore we can say that in general (except Japan and the US) the graph shows the peak starting from the second half of 1980s, including China. To be more precise, it **starts in 1979, then in 1985, 1992 and 1999 we can see a distinctive rising tendency**. This indicates a strong correlation of the foundation years and various reforms in China. Namely, 1978 was the starting year of the reform and opening policies; 1982 marks the official abolition of the people's commune system; in 1984 in line with the *Decision on the Economic Structural Reform* the liberalisation of the economy in urban districts started. In 1992, Dèng Xiǎopíng went on a historic tour on Southern China making various speeches stressing the need of economic reconstruction and liberalisation. Linked to all this, there were calls for reform of the government structure (in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003) and for the change of the social organization policy. Consequently, we can point out that as the figure 1 reveals, in China the changes are on a par with Russia, South-Korea and Germany, or even greater.¹⁴

Figure 1. Comparison of the foundation years



2.2. The functional characteristics of the organisations

The social organizations in China as compared to other countries cover a narrow spectrum. As this is very important point for the following comparison, I would like to first explain it further. According to the statistics presented above, of the social organizations, 30 % are business organisations, another 30% professional associations, 25% are academic and arts groups and over 10% are unions. There are no labour organisations or welfare organisations *etc.* as in the JIGS of other countries, but these groups are included in one or another category as far as they are fit for the conditions of the registration. In our research, the Beijing data showed 36% for business organisations, 22% academic and 21% professional organisations, and 15% federations, which compared to the actual distribution indicates slightly more business organisations and less professional organisations.

2.3. Members

The proportion of the groups with zero individual or organisational members in China is second only to Germany. Organisations with less than 50 individual members or 30 organisational members violate the regulations. The proportion of those groups is estimated in both Beijing and Zhejiang 17% and Heilongjiang 8%. There are few big organisations with many members, the most frequent is groups with 100 to 499 individual members. As for group members, except the category with no members (30%), the most frequent is 50 to 99 organisational groups; compared to other countries, there are more big organisations in China.

2.4. Personnel

Compared to other countries, there are fewer groups with many (over 30) staff members; in most organisations, there are 3 to 9 members, which on the other hand is similar to other countries. The illegal organisations with no staff are estimated around 7%.

2.5. Finance

The organisations with less than 10 thousand yuan (140 thousand yen) in assets are estimated 13%. It seems that these groups are not fulfilling the condition stated in the regulations of possession of assets and financial resources over 30 thousand yuan. The biggest categories are those of 10 thousand to 100 thousand yuan and 100 thousand to 500 thousand yuan of assets. Compared to other countries, the gap is 10 to 100 times, depending also on the currency rates.

2.6. Electronization

There are less than 10% of those who do not possess computers; around 30% use e-mail and those running their own homepages are estimated to be around 10% out of the total respondents. Compared to other countries, these numbers are not high; however, they are higher than those of the first Tokyo survey in 1997 are.


In short, seeing from the resources viewpoint, the social organizations in China are rather small in terms of individual members and finances, rather big in terms of organisational members, and are advancing to comparable state of development as the other countries.

3. Chinese social organizations' activities, relations, aims: 6 country comparison

3.1. The purpose of the operations

As the subject questions about the purposes in the Chinese survey is slightly different from those of the other countries, it can be rather complicated to grasp, but in the Figure 2, the position of Beijing is determined by the comparable subjects. The purposes of the groups activities deal with directions of external and internal from the associations, and with functions such as education, information, economy, politics *etc.*, in China they include the education within the association, presenting the information and cooperating with the administration, even influencing policy making in a comparable way. As seen, the wording differs, but the Chinese characteristics are not particularly conspicuous. The pursuit for economic profit or grant funds is relatively few. On the other hand, there are around 40% of those having the **characteristic of “interest groups”** providing information for preferential treatment or defending their rights and interest.

Figure 2. The purpose of the activities of the associations.




3.2. Policy concern

The characteristics of “interest groups” are also apparent from the social organizations’ concern about policy issues. As evident from the Figure 3, in this field all the countries have different characteristics. In order to better grasp the Chinese characteristics, the Figure 3 has been structured according to Chinese data, *i.e.* the highest level of policy concern *in China* on the left and lowest (or no relevance) *in China* on the right.

Namely, specific and local interest like industrial development policies, local administration policies *etc.* are the highest in Beijing. Additionally, the interest in policies concerning local development and consumers are relatively high. On the other hand, broader interest like health, welfare and medical treatment policies, also national security policies are of lowest concern in Beijing. Environmental policies and international exchange are relatively low.

The Figure 3 highlights the social organizations’ functional characteristics as “interest groups” and the characteristics of “locality” (as they are registered and guided by local administrations).


Figure 3. Policy concern



3.3. Lobbying orientation

Keeping in mind the purposes and policy concerns as explained above, the question of where the social organizations are exerting their influence rises. The answer is administration. In the Figure 4, in Japan, Germany, South-Korea and Russia respective percentages are the ratio of the most effective institution among them for lobbying (as estimated). In China, the percentage is the total of ranks first and second on the five-grade scale, so we cannot make a direct comparison but we can grasp the overall trend. In Germany and Russia, the legislation and political parties are as important as the executive power; the same or less so in South-Korea and Japan. On the other hand, in China the importance of the executive branch is relatively more important, same as in South-Korea and Japan.. From the administrative supervision perspective by the competent authorities, this can be seen as only natural, as the organisations that choose the administration count two times as much as those choosing the committee of the Communist Party. It should be, however, very interesting fact of note.

Figure 4. The effective actors for lobbying



3.4. Policy operations: the contact with the administration, lobby and information sources


In the Chinese case, the contact with the powerful administration is incomparable with the other four countries (except the US). Especially concerning the local authorities, the frequency of taking contact in Beijing is the highest, but also the contact frequency with the central government is not low. On the other hand, we can hardly point to their aim to lobby any other (than the administration) institution. Still, quite remarkably, “submitting professional information” is around 30% which is in line with the other countries;

“contacts with governmental offices” over 20% and “submitting information to the media” is estimated just under 10% (percentages are all out of total respondents)..

The Figure 5 presents the statistics of the organisations’ sources of information. To better understand the Chinese characteristics, the sources of information as compared to other countries have been presented according to Chinese data (as in the Figure 4). Ranking highest are the local authorities, businesses and the party; professional magazines, academia and members of the organisations rank also relatively high. National government, mass media and cooperative organisations *etc.* rank rather low.

Thus we understand that, concerning of where they acquire information, the Chinese social organizations show similar trends with other countries, with one characteristics being more reliant to **the local sources**, as the local administration is the major source of information followed by local and trade papers, professor and experts.

Figure 5. Sources of information




3.5. Connection to the administration

The social organizations that have in some sphere the monopoly in a certain administrative unit, after being registered and having close relations with the authorities of each level, are obliged to governmental investigation on their finances, personal assignments, and the observance of regulations. The Figure 6 presents the relative position of these groups, indicating the variety of administration guidance (*guakao*) and cooperation, and proposals for after-retirement posts. Further, it shows that the social organizations undertake a part of administrative duties from the government. Having the interest group characteristics and community nature, nevertheless relationship with the

administration makes the Chinese social organizations similar to Japanese governmental corporations (*tokushu-hojin*) or extra governmental organisations (*gaikaku-danntai*).

I don't want to delve here further as the focus of the presentation is comparison of the countries, just to conclude I would point out that the original questions of our Chinese survey revealed a variety of aspects concerning the dispatch of governmental, party or other personnel and finances. Namely, there is the close relationship between the social organizations and the administrative supervisors on the one hand, on the other, the relations with the party organisation is not remarkably tight, shown by the fact that only less than one fourth of social organizations has their own party branch. Further, the other subjects in the questionnaire indicate the pluralistic orientation and activities of the social organizations.¹⁵

Figure 6. Connection to the administration



4. The influence of the Chinese social organizations and the assessment of the influence

With the comparison of the data, we have so far made sure that the Chinese social organizations have less resource than those in the other countries, have tighter relations with the administration. Further, that they are very active in the mutual relations with the administrations, that they have multiple purposes and orientations towards various actors; and concerning the connection to the administration and providing information, they are to a certain extent similar to the organisations in other countries as interest groups.

4.1. The awareness of their influence in their field of operation

After the initial comparison, I would like to go on with the subjective assessment of their own influence and that of the other actors in the political society. First, compared to the other countries, the assessment of their own influence is in the case of the Chinese social organizations the lowest. Higher than “to some extent” estimates their influence only 10% of the associations. In Japan, South-Korea and Germany, more than half of all the groups consider it higher than “to some extent” and in Russia 90% of the groups consider their influence higher than “to some extent”. Therefore, we can say that in reality the associations understand that they are not quite independent or don’t have too much influence on their areas of operation. If comparing the three areas inside China, Heilongjiang shows the highest rate of self-confidence – 17%, while Beijing the lowest 13% out of total respondents.

4.2. The awareness of other actors’ influence

Now, the next question is, what associations, organisations or actors, do the social organizations think, have influential powers. The Figure 7 shows the comparison of the assessment of the actors in the six countries on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates “no influence at all” and 7 “the maximum influence”. In Beijing, the most influential is the administration, whereas the agricultural associations are estimated to be the least influential. The question about the influence itself appeared to be strange for most Chinese, who replied to the questionnaire. Still the response rate to these questions was just around 40 to 50% (even if it is low compared to other countries’ 70 to 90%).


China ranks the highest among all the countries in respect of local authorities, intellectuals and academics, international institutions, consumers associations, homemakers and women’s associations, residents’ associations and the welfare associations. The administration and foreign governments are the second highest in respect to those of the other countries. On the other hand, the large private businesses rank lowest in the comparison, further mass media and labour associations rank 5th.

From here again, two different characteristics can be seen. First, the emphasis on the “**locality**”, as mentioned earlier, all the social organizations have to be registered by the local authorities. And second, emphasis on the **regulations** - the operation in a socialist society under the rule of the Communist party, despite acceleration of market economy.

When taking a closer look at the Figure 7, we notice that the difference of the actors in Beijing is rather small, so all the Beijing data looks close to the average. If looking at

the actual statistical numbers, we see that the range is narrow and the variance is the smallest among the countries.¹⁶ Thus, we can say that the **assessment of the influence in China is equalized and pluralistic** compared to other countries.

Figure 7. The comparison of the assessment of influence



Note) *Senior Party Officials in China's Case **Social Community Organization in China's Case


4.3. The assessment of influence at times of reforms and of door opening

The question of how the reforms and the opening in the economic sphere, that started in the end of 1970s and speeded up in the 1980s and 1990s, influenced the Chinese social organizations rises. Although retrospective, we asked the social organizations. As the Figure 8 indicates, there can be seen a big change in Beijing. Among the 18 actors, 11 have been able to increase their estimated influence, whereas private businesses, intellectuals and academics, consumers associations, and further, foreign interest groups, and international institutions have risen remarkably, followed by the residents' associations, mass media, university students, welfare associations and various democratic political factions. **Especially the private businesses, even if low in relation to other actors, have risen from 2-point "almost no" influence to 4 or 5 point "rather influential". Intellectuals and academics, residents' associations that are not too closely tied to the government, have also spread their influence being charged with plurality and civil society character. In addition, it is interesting to note that the Chinese are more and more conscious of the wave of internationalisation.**

On the other hand, those groups who have decreased their estimated influence are the cornerstone of the socialist society, namely the labour and agricultural associations and state-owned enterprises. Also women's associations, welfare associations, and the key of the regime, the Communist party have decreased their influence. Therefore, at least

on the level of assessment by social organizations' leaders, as the reforms and opening progresses, the structure of influence gets more and more pluralistic.

Figure 8. The assessment of influence at times of reforms and of door opening



5. Conclusion

In this presentation, I compared the results of the Chinese survey of the social organizations with the other JIGS results. Even from this very initial analysis we can see that despite the fundamental differences in the system and the extent of development, the Chinese social organizations survey is reasonable. That is to say, there are various opportunities to exploring hypothesis and comparisons.

As mentioned in the beginning, one of the quests of the exploration was the transformation of the Chinese society, its plurality and civil society character.

First, we looked at the years of establishment. Mostly the social organizations are established very recently, starting from the 1990s. The reform- and opening policies in 1979, the urban areas' reform in 1985 and the historical South-China tour by Deng Xiaoping in 1992 and the 1999 reform of the social organizations, accelerated the formation of the associations, **which made them comparable to the associations in Russia, South-Korea and Germany.**

Secondly, considering the novelty of the social organizations, their resources are relatively decent. On one hand, the Chinese social organizations have not so many individual members or finances, nevertheless the number of organisational members is

big, so we can as well call them associations of associations. Therefore, we can argue that the social organizations in China **are reaching comparable state of development as the organisations in other countries.**

Third, looking at the institutional characteristics of the social organizations, we can point to the **tight relationship with the administration**, the amount of administrative duties is remarkable, they have multiple interests in the policy making, their aims involve various actors. Thus, they are to some extent similar in their activities to the organisations in other countries, considering the relations with the administration and proposing information.

Finally, the influence of the social organizations. First, the social organizations assess **their own influence as being very small**. Further, as for the influence of other actors, the private businesses and mass media rank low reflecting the characteristics of a socialist society under the rule of the Communist party despite accelerating its market economy. At the same time, the basis of socialism, the labour and agricultural organisations rank also low. But the most interesting is the change. Private businesses, intellectuals and academics, consumers associations, further foreign interest groups, and international institutions have widened their influence remarkably, followed by the residents' associations, mass media, university students, welfare associations and various democratic political factions. On the other hand, the labour and agricultural associations and state-owned enterprises have sharply decreased their estimated influence, followed by peoples' associations and various groups approved by government. As apparent also from the statistically small variance, the **structure of influence is steadily becoming more pluralistic**, at least from the perspective of the leaders of social organizations. To understand the full meaning of this process, a more detailed research is needed.

The result of the analysis, that the social organizations have the characteristics of **“interest groups” being oriented towards “locality”**, is very interesting considering the local authorities' autonomy. Here I presented the questions concerning the interest in policymaking, information sources and influence, but many questions original to the Chinese survey only, showed the same trend. Since the open-door reforms and the change into market economy, the discretionary authority of the local governments has widened, concerning several economic policies including industrial promotion and development. At the same time, the effectiveness of the central control is being questioned, and the operation of the social organizations hints at a certain autonomy of each of the central – provincial – prefectural – county levels.

Here I presented the initial comparative descriptive analysis of the JIGS data, including the Chinese data. Further analysis is needed to make more far-reaching deductions about the Chinese society, but so far, we can say that our social organizations' survey indicates **the transformation of the Chinese inner structures.**

¹ Currently it is not allowed for a foreign research team to do independently a survey in China. The questionnaires for the present research were distributed by the Peking University research team, and the data analysis was done by our Japanese team. See Peking University Institute of Political Development and Governance, Civil Society Organisations Research Centre “*Beijing, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang Social Associations Questionnaire Survey Codebook I*” 2004 Feb (in Chinese) / 北京大学政治発展と政府管理研究所公民社会団体研究中心 『北京・浙江、黒龍江省/市 社会団体問巻調査表データ報告集(一)』 / See also Tsujinaka *et.al.* „*A Systematic Comparative Survey of Japanese and South-Korean Public Policy and Policy Process: Codebook II The Comparative Data of Japan and China*“, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Report, 2005 March (in Japanese) / 辻中豊研究代表 『日本・韓国の公共政策・政策過程に関する体系的比較研究：資料編. 日本・中国における比較データ』 科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書.

In Beijing Metropolitan area [all of the associations](#), in Zhejiang and Heilongjiang provinces in all – provincial, prefectural and county – levels, around half of the officially registered associations were surveyed.

Table 1. China survey [sample](#)

	Sample size	Number of surveyed	Valid responses	Percentage of valid responses
Beijing	2188	1807	627	34.7%
Zhejiang	5270	5093	1782	35.0%
Heilongjiang	2078	1997	449	22.5%
total	9536	8897	2858	32.1%

² On JIGS see Tsujinaka „*Contemporary Japanese Civil Society and Interest Groups*“ / 『現代日本市民社会・利益団体』 / Bokutakusha 2002; Tsujinaka and Yeom Jeho (廉載鎬) „*Contemporary South-Korean Civil Society and Interest Groups*“ / 『現代韓国市民社会・利益団体』 / Bokutakusha 2004. Japanese, Korean, American and German surveys are based on telephone directory by occupation; Chinese, Turkish, Russian, Philippines and Brazilian surveys are based on the governmental records comprehensive lists. All the surveys are conducted on two or three areas including the capital city of each country.

³ On the comparison of Chinese social associations with those of the other countries see Kazuko Kojima and Yutaka Tsujinaka “Chinese politics and society as seen from the social associations: based on the survey of the Chinese social associations (2001-2002) and the JIGS 1997 survey” / 「社団中国政治社会—中国社団調査（2001 - 2）・日韓基礎団体調査（JIGS 調査 1997）」 / in “*Compendium of the Presentations at the Comparative Political Science 2003 Conference*” / 2003 年度大会報告論文集/. See also the analysis of the Chinese social associations survey data in Kazuko Kojima and Yutaka Tsujinaka „Chinese politics and society as seen from the „social associations“: Chinese survey (2001 – 2002)“ in “*Comparing Chinese Politics*”, Waseda University

2004. In addition, on Chinese non-profit sector see O Mei, Kenen Ri and Mieko Okamuro „*Chinese NPO*“, Daiichi Shorin 2002. As the report of the Chinese research team, there is also „*The Development of Chinese Civil Society in the Era of Change: Report of the Results of Beijing, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang Civil Society Survey*“/轉型期中国公民社会發展研究報告-北京・浙江、黒龍江三省社会团体調査を中心に/ (in Chinese) Peking University Institute of Political Development and Governance, Civil Society Organisations Research Centre, January 2005.

⁴ Needless to say that not only the Chinese but also the other JIGS surveys, either based on telephone directories or others, have their fixed limits as civil society organisations surveys. In order to overcome these limitations we are currently designing the Second International JIGS survey (for 2006 – 2010).

⁵ See Kojima and Tsujinaka 2003: 4 – 5. Since the registration, the number of the private non-profit groups also started to increase rapidly – from 5901 in 1999 to 135 181 by the end of 2004. See „*Ministry of Civil Affairs 2004 Statistical Report on the Development of Civil Activities*“ /民政部 2004 年民政事業發展統計報告/Table A4, Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.mca.gov.cn>

⁶ See Kojima and Tsujinaka 2004: 72

⁷ See Kojima and Tsujinaka 2004: 51 - 53

⁸ See „*Ministry of Civil Affairs 2004 Statistical Report on the Development of Civil Activities*“ /民政部 2004 年民政事業發展に関する統計報告/Table B3, Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.mca.gov.cn> The social organizations’ statistics itself has started since 1988 where the category of the private non-business units exists since 1999 and the private foundation was separated from the social organization category since 2002.

⁹ *Ibid.* As I am going to explain later, the classification of social associations consists of four categories – business, professional, arts&sciences and unions. Labour unions account for 900 thousand groups, but only the part of them that fulfils the provisions of the Civil Code, is registered. The same goes for other associations.

¹⁰ See Kojima and Tsujinaka 2004: 54 - 55

¹¹ See Tsujinaka Yutaka „*Contemporary Japanese Civil Society and Interest Groups*“, Bokutakusha 2002: 234 – 35, 248

¹² Tsujinaka and Yeom Jeho 廉載鎬 „*Contemporary South-Korean Civil Society and Interest Groups*“, Bokutakusha 2004. See specially the Chapter 4, Tsujinaka and Jae Hyoun Hong 崔宰榮 „*The Formation of Organisations and the Change of Political Structure*“ / 「団体形成と政治体制の変化」 /

¹³ Among these six countries, the US survey has the least comparable subjects, thus the comparison is mainly on five countries. In every country, we surveyed at least two areas, but in this paragraph, I concentrate mainly on the capital cities.

¹⁴ The chapter on the foundation years of the associations in every country hints at the changes and transformations in the political system with the big changes in the social association policy. For example, Japanese and German structural changes and reforms right after the defeat in the war (1945 – 50); South-Korean privatisation and civilianization (1987,1992); German unification (1990); the extinction of the Soviet Union (1991); similar can be said about the US and China.

¹⁵ See Kojima and Tsujinaka 2004: 60 - 62

¹⁶ The range and variance of all the countries is as follows: China 2.62 and .523, respectively; Japan 2.90 and .889; South-Korea 3.17 and .887; teh US 2.98 and .778, Germany 2.76 and .882 and Russia 3.0 and 1.16, respectively.