Which Civil Society Organizations in Which Countries are Enjoying Policy-Making Processes and Why:
Comparing 7 Countries (Japan, South Korea, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines) in JIGS Survey

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Introduction: Explaining the Differences in Subjective Influence Score in Seven Countries

Let us begin by looking at Figure 1. It summarizes the results of a survey question which asks the following: “When policy problems arise in the geographical areas suggested in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?”

Figure 1. Subjective Influence Score (mean) by Country

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1 Q7 of Japan JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey (Tsujinaka ed.1999). We have conducted JIGS surveys in 9 countries (Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, and Brazil) in more than 2 locations each, but in this paper, we focus on 7 countries (capitals). The United States and Brazil are excluded in the analysis because no questions regarding SIS were included in the U.S. survey, and data is currently being analyzed in the Brazil survey. It is important to note that there are slight differences in nuance in the questions asked in each country. The followings are the actual questions used in the survey (translated from the local language):

**Japan:** “When policy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?”

**South Korea:** “When policy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?”

**Germany:** “How big do you think is the influence your organization has on the area in which it conducts its activities?”

**China:** “Overall, how much influence does your organization have on government’s policy-making processes in your areas of activities?”
The respondents, civil society organizations (hereafter CSOs) in capital cities in surveyed countries, self-evaluated their influence, and were asked to choose one answer from the following five: extremely influential=4, influential=3, somewhat influential=2, not influential=1, and at all influential=0. (We will refer to country names rather than city names hereafter.) We then compiled these scores, or Subjective Influence Score (SIS), and calculated the mean (or SIS (mean)) for each country.

If Figure 1 actually reflects the reality, then why do CSOs in the Philippines and Russia seem to enjoy policy-making processes by wielding strong influence, while those in Germany, South Korea, and Japan are not as influential and successful in managing the political-process? Moreover, why do CSOs in China and Turkey seem to suffer even more from the lack of influence?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to provide a first cut to understand the realities of CSOs and politics, using the above questions as a starter. There is no doubt that the interactions between the state and society, or the characteristics of political regimes, history, culture, people’s awareness, and institutional legacies all affect organizations’ self-evaluation regarding influence. Here, however, we attempt to understand such differences among countries by comparing JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey data.

To be sure, policy influence as referred to here is by no means real or absolute. It is merely a self-evaluation in certain policy issue area in which a certain CSO is active. However, it might be possible to infer that, in a society where CSOs score high SIS, they are relatively “enjoying” to exert their influence.

Another goal of this paper is to explore the meaning of SIS when we examine the relationships between each country’s SIS and related variables. This attempt makes important

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Turkey: “When policy problems arise in the geographical area categorized in Q6 (1. Village, town or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?”
Russia: “How much influence does your organization have on solving problems in your geographic area of activities?”
Philippines: “When policy problem occur in the geographical area indicated in Q6, how much influence does your organization have in solving these problems through certain governmental measures (for instance, enactment of laws, etc.)?”

2 It is possible to argue that CSOs in some cultures tend to overstate their score (such as influence) than others, but that is beyond the scope of our analysis. This kind of cultural bias can be seen in the comparative social capital studies (see OECD 2002 and Putnam ed. 2002). By using the Japanese and Korean survey data, Choe and Tsujinaka (2004) has conducted a systematic analysis on the factors that influence SIS. The variables used in this paper are based on their analysis. As we see in the chi-square test conducted in the latter section of the paper, SIS and “Policy Influence: Success in Formulating Policy” show statistical significance (level of significance 0.01) in all countries surveyed. As for the relationships between SIS and “Policy Influence: Success in Blocking/Revising Policy,” while the results in the Philippines (significance probability 0.074), China (0.043), and South Korea (0.015) are rather weak, we find it statistically significant (level of significance 0.01) in other countries.
theoretical contributions to comparative empirical studies in the future\(^3\).

Let us look at some variables related to SIS (SIS (mean) in each country, SIS (mean) rankings, the percentage of organizations that think they have influence, etc.) and the overview of the countries surveyed.

Table 1 clearly shows that economic health (GDP per capita) and the level of political and social freedom (Freedom House ratings) are not reflected in SIS. In other words, while such indicators in Russia (Moscow) and the Philippine (Manila) are lower compared to that of any other developed countries’, the SIS in these countries are higher than that of developed countries’. The levels of political and social freedom are high in developed countries (Germany, South Korea, and Japan), but they are not necessarily reflected in the level of SIS. The rate of volunteer participation and NGO vitality may affect SIS, but the data is only partial, thus not definite.

### TABLE 1. Overview of Countries Surveyed in JIGS (capital city data\(^*\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (n.1)</th>
<th>Freedom House rating (n.1)</th>
<th>CNSP (CSS) (n.2)</th>
<th>Volunteering Workforce (n.2)</th>
<th>NGO Vitality (n.3)</th>
<th>Subjective Influence Score (SIS) (n.4)</th>
<th>Subjective Influence Score (SIS) ranking (n.4)</th>
<th>% of SIS strong (n.4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22,740</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>34,010</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>9,930</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>6-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>7-6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>35,400</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) In each country, the data was collected in the capital and more than one other region. But in this paper, we used the data of the capital only.

\(^3\) How to measure “influence” of groups has been a difficult crux in the interest group studies. Most of the literature adopted case studies, not survey questions (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998:128-139). In this context, we can contribute theoretically by identifying the significance of SIS.
I. Methodology and Hypotheses:
Methods, Scope, and the Meaning of JIGS Survey, and Hypotheses Examined in this Paper

Before going into further analyses, let us first explain our survey project, The International Survey of Civil Society and Interest Groups (hereafter “JIGS survey,” which originally stands for Japan Interest Group Survey) that provides the data for this paper’s analyses.

1) The main characteristic of the methodology and scope of JIGS is that it cross-culturally surveys directly the basic core (associations: their resources, attributes, behaviors, relations, etc.) of civil society in 10 countries. Although “associations are an essential part – and perhaps the least controversial part – of civil society” (Schwartz and Pharr 2003: 32), it is quite rare to find researches other than JIGS that systematically and comparatively survey associations exclusively. This may be because it is quite daunting to target appropriate research subjects and carry out large-scale surveys in many countries.

Unlike surveys that focus on institutional and economic statistical data like the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project led by Salamon (with Anheier 1997, with Anheier, Regina and Wojciech 1999), or individual survey data like Putnam and OECD Social Capital group, the JIGS surveys focus exclusively on each country’s CSO survey data. This allows us for the first time to comprehensively grasp the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations of CSOs in the countries surveyed.

There is no doubt that defining and empirically grasping CSOs are difficult. However, it is impossible to understand the characteristics of social capital and civil society without understanding the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations of CSOs.

Putnam (1993, 2000) uses variety of aggregate data, but does not conduct surveys to the associations (except other objects, like citizens and local governments), therefore, do not have essential data on organizations’ behaviors and relations. In Japan, the research headed by Yamauchi (eds. with Ibuki 2005) systematically examines CSOs, but his group’s focus is on nonprofit organizations (hereafter NPOs), thus, the scope is limited. Also the data is mainly quantitative.

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4 Regarding the methodology and outputs of International JIGS surveys, see Tsujinaka 2003, Tsujinaka ed.2002, Tsujinaka and Ycom eds. 2004, and Kojima and Tsujinaka 2003. See also Table 2 in this paper for other references.
5 There are several good comparative studies but their methods are more descriptive and their data are rather non-systemic. See Putnam eds. 2002 and Shigetomi ed. 2002.
The JIGS survey, on the other hand, is more comprehensive. Its goal is to cover all associations and unions except the government (the state), private business (the market), and families. More specifically, we focus on all non-governmental, private, independent, and voluntary social organizations that are established enough to have a phone line. (In case where identification of organization by phone book classifications is difficult, we relied on comprehensive lists complied by a certain sector or by the government. See note 4)

Our definition does not include “non-profit-distributing” element covered in Salamon et al’s definition (Salamon and Anheier 1997, e.g.). Cooperative organizations and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that take the form of a for-profit enterprise are important parts of the entire CSOs. However, if this element is included, they are automatically classified as enterprises. Therefore, we exclude the “non-profit-distributing” element in our definition as well.

Like Salamon, however, we exclude religious worship organizations. We include CSOs that are religious, but not worship. On the other hand, while Salamon includes public enterprises such as hospitals, private schools, and social welfare institutions, we believe that they are more of a public organization, or a hybrid of government and enterprise, rather than a CSO. Thus, we exclude such organizations from our definition.

Consequently, Salamon’s statistical data grasps civil society by focusing primarily on non-profit sector or service establishment, while the JIGS data puts more weight on associations and unions.

As Table 2 shows, we have surveyed 10 countries in the first round of JIGS, and the data of 8 countries are currently available. Since these countries surveyed are quite diverse in terms of the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations, our project easily passes one of the criteria, set by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, which is “to select a set of countries that differed enough along key dimensions to allow us to test some of major theories in this field.” (Center for Civil Society Studies n.d.)

As also shown in Table 2, survey methods differ slightly in countries to countries, hence, we need to understand that this might somewhat affect the results of the survey. JIGS surveys include many questions and variables. But the 7-country comparison conducted in this paper relies on variables used in detailed Japan-Korea SIS study, which has already been completed (Choe and Tsujinaka 2004).
### TABLE 2. Overview of JIGS 10 Country Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Data Source / Survey Method</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample (a)</th>
<th>Valid Response (b)</th>
<th>Return Rate (%) (b/a)</th>
<th>Regions (Valid Return Sample)</th>
<th>@Principal Survey Researcher /Note/ Codebook References, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>’97</td>
<td>classified telephone directory / mail</td>
<td>23,128</td>
<td>4,247</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>Tokyo (1,438) Ibaraki (197)</td>
<td>@ TSUJINAKA, Yutaka / Tsujinaka 1999a; Tsujinaka 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>’97</td>
<td>classified telephone directory / mail</td>
<td>11,521</td>
<td>3,890</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>Seoul (371) Kyonggi (110)</td>
<td>@ YEOM, Jaeho / 12 organizations removed since unable to identify regional classifications: 481 organizations / Tsujinaka1999b; Tsujinaka and Yeom 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>’99</td>
<td>classified telephone directory / mail</td>
<td>7,228</td>
<td>5,089</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>Washington, D.C. (748) North Carolina (752)</td>
<td>@ TSUJINAKA, Yutaka / 8 organizations added from preliminary survey: 1500 organizations / Tsujinaka2001a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>'00</td>
<td>classified telephone directory, organization directory / mail</td>
<td>4,806</td>
<td>3,074</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>Berlin (643) Halle (154)</td>
<td>@FOLYANTY-JOST, Gesine, TSUBO GO, Minoru / Tsujinaka 2001b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>'01-02, '03-04</td>
<td>“Social Groups” officially registered at the Municipal or District/Country Civil Affairs Bureau / mail</td>
<td>9,536</td>
<td>8,897</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>Beijing (627), Xianju (1,782), Heilongjiang (449)</td>
<td>@LI, Jingpeng, YUAN, Ruijun / Tsujinaka 2005b. Kojima and Tsujinaka 2003,2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>'03 - 04</td>
<td>Regional survey investigation based on telephone directory / interview</td>
<td>15,730</td>
<td>Appr. 1,500</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ankara (334) Istanbul (507)</td>
<td>@ HIRAI, Yukiko, KANSU, Aykut / telephone directory Ankara (4512) Istanbul (11218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>'03-04</td>
<td>Registered Organization (NGO) Database / mail</td>
<td>2,974</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>Moscow (411) Saint Petersburg (300)</td>
<td>@ SMIRNOV, William / Able to contact 1893 organizations out of 2974 / Tsujinaka 2005a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipine</td>
<td>'04-05</td>
<td>Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Philippine Foundation Center (PFC) / interview</td>
<td>44,051</td>
<td>5,472</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Manila (855) Cebu (159)</td>
<td>@BAL LECAS, Maria Rosario-Piquero, SHUTO, Motoko / sampled only organizations with a phone number / Ballescas, Shuto, and Tsujinaka 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>'05-06</td>
<td>Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) / interview</td>
<td>275,895</td>
<td>3,000 (estimate)</td>
<td>1,500 (estimate)</td>
<td>50 (estimate)</td>
<td>Brasilia,Recife,Belem (Belo Horizonte)</td>
<td>@KONDO, Edson Kenji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>'06-07</td>
<td>Telephone books, Directories</td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>1500 (estimate)</td>
<td>800 (estimate)</td>
<td>50 (estimate)</td>
<td>Dhaka, Rajshahi</td>
<td>@TASNIM, Farhat, SHAKIL, Ahmed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) Next, we will briefly introduce various hypotheses that will be examined in more details later.⁷

• **Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis**
  The structure of CSOs varies in each country, since it reflects distinctive history, culture, and state-society relations. This hypothesis argues that the structure, or sector proportion of CSOs, explains the differences in SIS in each country. In order to test the hypothesis, we first need to investigate which sector is highly organized by CSOs by comparing four sectors: profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other. This reveals the characteristics and trends of each sector. If the differences in the proportion of sectors explain the differences in SIS, then the implication would be that power or policy influence does not directly affect SIS.

• **Resource Hypothesis**
  This hypothesis states that differences in objective resources such as organizational resources and the year established of CSOs in each country explain the differences in SIS. We compare the basic resources of organizations in four sectors. The reason why we examine the year CSOs are established is because it can be considered as a comprehensive indicator that shows the wealth (durability) of resources. The assumption is that the longer a CSO has existed, the more it is likely to have durable and abundant resources. In other words, unless a CSO has plenty of resources, it could not have existed for a long time.

• **Political Activism Hypothesis**
  This hypothesis states that SIS is a function of aggressive activities of CSOs. In other words, policy activism determines SIS. If this hypothesis is valid, SIS can be considered as a reflection of CSOs’ policy influence.

• **Administration Connection Hypothesis**
  This hypothesis suggests that SIS is a function of mutual relations between CSOs and administrative actors, or the strength of institutional relations. It overlaps with the above Political Activism Hypothesis, and cannot be clearly separated because both put emphasis on actors’ behaviors based on relations. This hypothesis is related to the characteristics of political systems (regimes) such as statism and corporatism.

**(Orientation Hypothesis)**

Differences in subjective orientations such as aims and ideologies of CSOs may explain the differences in SIS. There are other possible hypotheses, but these will be discussed in other paper.

3) Method of Analysis
There are basically three methods:

- Examine the relations (whether liner or non-liner) between each country’s SIS and related variables after checking scatter diagrams for the variables that show significance. The relationships cannot be considered as causal, but we consider it as an inference.

- Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in cross-tabulation analysis in each country, and find statistical significance through chi-square tests.

- Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in each sector (profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other) of each country in the cross-tabulation analysis. Find statistical significance through chi-square tests.

Even if we find an inference from test ⊖, results in ⊖ and ⊖ are still independent. However, if we could pass all the tests, the inference regarding the relationships between SIS and certain variables may be one step closer to establishing causal relationships.

Although more systematic multivariate analysis is required since SIS in each country is a product of more multidimensional variables, such analysis will not be covered in this paper. (For a detailed comparative analysis of Japan and Korea, see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004.)

We now turn to each hypothesis in more details.

II. Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis

The structure of CSO, or a proportion of various sectors, is affected by each country’s distinctive history, institutional legacies, and path dependence. This is why it is difficult to create a common classification for CSOs that can be used in cross-national surveys. In the very first JIGS survey conducted in Japan, we asked the respondents to choose one from ten classifications. In the surveys that followed, we have tailored the question to each country’s situations. As a result, the number ranges from 4 in China to 32 in Russia (see Appendix A).

However, we have designed the question in such a way that made it possible to compare classifications among countries. In order to make comparisons easier, we have adopted
4 sector classifications (profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other (N.E.C., or Not Elsewhere Classified) here in this paper.

The Profit sector includes economic organizations that have strong ties to agricultural, forestry, fishing, and manufacturing industries, as well as labor and employers organizations. The Nonprofit sector includes organizations that provide professional services related to professional, educational, research, welfare, medical, and administrative issues. The Citizen sector is composed of organizations that citizens can participate as an individual. They include organizations related to politics, citizens, religion, and sports/hobby. Other includes organizations that do not fit into the above three sectors, and also those voluntarily chose to be in this category in the questionnaire. Profit, nonprofit, and citizen sectors very much correspond with the three classifications used in Muramatsu, Itoh, and Tsujinaka (1986; Tsujinaka 1988) which are producer, policy taker, and advocacy.

Figure 2. The Proportion of Four Sectors in Each Country

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8 Walker 1993. Walker’s classifications are based on the types of occupation, while ours are based on the category names from which we asked organizations to choose.

9 The Caveat is that in China, we focused on social organizations only, and used classifications that are unique to those Chinese organizations. They are industry, professional, academic/culture, and federation. In this paper, we tried to correspond these categories to profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other, respectively. However, there are no classifications that strictly represent citizen organizations in China. We acknowledge this is a problem. Moreover, since respondents in Russia and Turkey are allowed to choose more than one classifications, we need to be cautious about the results as well.
Figure 2 interestingly shows that there are three distinctive clusters of countries. The first is the Philippines and Russia that have high SIS. The Citizen sector is the largest in these two countries, occupying almost 50 percent of the entire four sectors. The second cluster is Germany and South Korea where more than one third of organizations is nonprofit, which is the largest. The third is Japan and China where more than one third is profit sector organizations. In Turkey, more than half of the organizations are other (Most are regional solidarity associations. Turkey’s classification method needs to be reconsidered).

We find a high correlation between the proportion of the citizen sector and SIS (mean) (Figure 3-1). On the other hand, we find a reverse correlation between the profit sector and SIS (mean) (Figure 3-2). (We find no correlations between SIS (mean) and the nonprofit sector or other sector.) The Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis, therefore, may be valid.\(^\text{10}\)

\[\text{Figure 3-1. Citizen Sector}\]

\(^{10}\) We, however, do not infer that there is a causal relationship between these variables. There is no doubt that the structure (sector proportion) may be an indicator to reveal the state-society relations, but it may simply appear so on the surface. But as the following analysis shows, the organizations in the citizen sector are active, and hence, we presume that the relations here are substantial.
Analyzing SIS by sector, SIS (mean) of the citizen sector is the highest among four sectors in South Korea and Japan. In the Philippines and Russia, the order (from high to low) of the SIS (mean) is other, profit, nonprofit, and citizen. In Germany, China, and Turkey, the SIS (mean) of the profit sector was the highest. (See the supplementary summary of country analysis in the end of this paper.)

On the other hand, the SIS (mean) country ranking of the citizen sector is the same as that of the overall SIS ranking. To be more specific, it was 2.65 in the Philippines, 2.57 in Russia, 1.96 in Germany, 1.91 in South Korea, 1.56 in Japan, 0.99 in China, and 0.96 in Turkey. The ranking order of the nonprofit sector is the same. In the profit sector ranking, Germany was ranked number one, and Turkey came in higher than China.

It is clear that SIS of the citizen sector and its proportion determine each country’s SIS. However, relatively speaking, organizations in the citizen sector in countries where SIS is high do not necessarily self-evaluate themselves highly, when compared to actors in other sectors. It is interesting to note the possibility that the proportion of the citizen sector in each country (capital) and SIS of the citizen sector determine the overall SIS (mean).

Where does the confidence of citizen sector organizations come from?
III. Resource Hypothesis

1) Resource Hypothesis (A): Year Established

Do CSOs’ resources affect SIS?

In previous studies, a hypothesis has been denied that an organization’s resources would exert influence across different sectors (see Tsujinaka 1988, Muramatsu, Itoh and Tsujinaka 1986. Also see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Subjective resources, such as “reputation,” however, are an exception because the increase of reputation is proportional to the increase in influence. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that those with many members and financial resources generally have strong influence within a certain sector (Choe and Tsujinaka 2004; Tsujinaka 1998; Muramatsu, Itoh, and Tsujinaka 1986).

Let us examine the relationships between each country’s resources and SIS.

Trend in Year Established and SIS

Domestically speaking, unlike reputation, the year established, or the age of an organization when the survey was conducted, has been considered as a variable that may be related to influence. The older age may perhaps help strengthen organizational resources and the relationships between political actors, win trust, and increase influence. This premise is likely to be valid at least within a sector (Tsujinaka 1988: 64; Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Here, let us consider whether year established correlates with SIS in all the countries surveyed.

Figure 4 shows the percentage, calculated every five years, of all organizations established during the 100-year time (from 1900 to around 2000) in each country. In this figure, which includes the data of 8 countries, we note that Japan and the United States are the exception. In other words, in other 6 countries, most organizations were established in the late 1980 and the 90s.

We need to be careful, however, that there is a 7-year gap between the first survey (1997) and the last one (2004), and that it does not include organizations that dissolved before the survey was conducted. Another limit is that we cannot tell from the data whether the organization is entirely a new or a merged one between existing organizations. This point is particularly important since the change in political system (regime) often cause such realignment of organizations.
Figure 4. Year Established (%)
Due to space limitations, we could not prove our grand hypothesis, but the authors believe that there is a strong relationship between changes in political systems (regimes) and the establishment (or a birth) of organizations (Tsujinaka and Yeom eds. 2004). In this sense, we can understand that postwar reform in Japan and the liberal reform after the Civil Rights Movement, or interest group liberalism in the United States (Lowi 1979), positively affected the number of organizations established.

Major shifts in political systems (regimes) may have also affected the establishment of organizations in other countries. Examples of such major changes are: Postwar reform as well as the 1990 reunification of Germany; the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and liberalization after that in Russia; the reform and liberalization policy/Southern Tour (1992) in China; liberalization and civilianization since 1987 in South Korea; negotiations for EU accession (EC until 1987, and EU after 1993) and liberalization in Turkey; and liberalization after the Aquino regime (1983) in the Philippines.

Again the caveat is that we survey the year established of only existing organizations. Thus, if CSOs are vulnerable and if the cycle of establishment and disestablishment is short, the data would always show that most organizations are established in recent years.

The effects of political system (regime) change aside, we believe that the permanence of organizations is the source, the sum, and at the same time, the result of resources. Hence, if there were more organizations with long history, we would expect them to have a strong influence. Although Japan, Germany, and South Korea have more permanent organizations, why do they have relatively lower SIS than Russia and the Philippines, and higher SIS than Turkey and China? This is a puzzling result from the survey.

Moreover, we analyzed the correlations between SIS and the year established, but could not confirm any relationships. In other words, we infer, as a result of the test of the Resource Hypothesis (A), that, at a national level, there is no relation between SIS and the year established.

Moreover, if we examine the year established in four sectors separately, we can conclude the followings:

1) When compared to other sectors, most of the organizations in the Citizen sector were established around the 1990s (Figure 5-1). However, in developed countries like the United States, Germany, and Japan, there are relatively many organizations with a long history, established before and after the war and in the 1960s. There are perhaps mainly two reasons why many organizations emerged around the 1990s: one was a political system (regime) change many countries went through, and the other was the overall vulnerability of CSOs.
2) In the Profit sector, we find large differences among countries as well as in their development paths (Figure 5-2). In developed countries, the majorities of organizations in this sector were created before and after WWII, and have a long history. Many organizations were established in countries that went through political system (regime) changes (including Germany) and in developing countries (and quite many in Germany and South Korea) since the late 1980s.

3) The Nonprofit sector shows a trend that falls somewhere between the Citizen and the Profit sectors. Here, in developing countries, many organizations were also established since the late 1980s. However, in other countries, the number is spread more or less evenly in the postwar era. It then somewhat increases since the late 1980s in countries that went through political systems (regimes) changes.

In terms of the relationships between the year established and SIS (mean), organizations, except for those in the Philippines, established before the war until the mid-1960s tend to show a rather high SIS score.

However, when we examine the Citizen sector, newly emerging organizations established since the late 1980s, except for those in Germany, show higher SIS than the average score in each country. Such trend cannot be found in other sectors. This may mean that the Citizen sector shows high SIS exactly because it is young and energetic.

As discussed in the previous section, the proportion of the Citizen sector positively affect a country’s overall SIS, but citizen organizations do not usually have a long history in any country. What the Citizen sector can boast of is not its permanence.

Rather, it is the fact that it is emerging. The SIS of the Citizen sector was not necessarily high in countries that had high country scores. We believe that the young citizen sector is consequently raising the overall score.
Figure 5.1. Year Established: Citizen Sector
Figure 5-2. Year Established: Profit Sector
Table 3 summarizes the result of the cross-tabulation analysis (chi-square test), examining the relationships between the year established and SIS. We find the level of significance of the analysis (0.05) in Russia, Germany, and Japan, but overall weak. Moreover, the coefficient was negative (i.e., newer organizations showed a high level of significance, the opposite result expected from the hypothesis).

### TABLE 3. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Resource-Year Established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country with significance found in cross-tabulation</th>
<th>Country/Sector with significance found in cross-tabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Established: R<em>G</em>J* (n.3)</td>
<td>G: P,c/ J:o/R: C (n.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Name (n.1) Ph/R/G/K/J/C/T</td>
<td>CN and Sector (n.2) P,NP,C,O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n.1) Ph: Philippine/ R: Russia /G: Germany/K: Korea/J: Japan/C: China/T: Turkey.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n.2) P: Profit sector/ NP: Non-profit sector/ C: Citizen sector/ O: Other, Not elsewhere classified.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n.3) ** under level of significance of 0.01 , * : under level of significance of 0.05.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n.4) capital letters= under the level of significance of 0.05; small letters=under the level of significance of 0.10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Resource Hypothesis (B): Organizational Resources

**Cross-tabulation analysis (countries and sectors) and SIS**

To find out the relationships between SIS and organizational resources, we have conducted cross-tabulation analyses for each country and sector. However, we cannot find any relations in any of the resources because the results are either insignificant or confusing.

As Table 4 shows, cross-tabulation analysis of resources (country/sector) and SIS did not yield any significant results. We even found completely opposite results from what the hypothesis predicted. In countries where there are many citizen organizations (Philippines), new organizations with small resources showed high SIS.

In sum, neither comprehensive resources such as the year established nor the organizational resources just examined cannot confirm the significance with SIS.

This result may not be surprising. First of all, the size of resource does not tell us how much of it can actually be mobilized for affecting political processes.

Moreover, since SIS is a self-evaluation of one’s own organization in policy making or political processes, it is easy to imagine that the following issues also matter: the context of policy and political process; relative relations and evaluations with other actors; and
institutional context of organization in society. No matter how abundant the resources are, an organization cannot attain high SIS, if the rival organizations or other actors have more resources.

If resources do not affect SIS, then what other factors will?
We will next examine the behavior of CSOs in political processes.

**TABLE 4. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Organizational Resource**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Country Name (Ph/R/G/K/J/C/Tu)</th>
<th>CN and Sector (P,NP,C,O)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member (individual)</td>
<td>No significance</td>
<td>No significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member (organizational)</td>
<td>No significance</td>
<td>No significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Ph**, R**, G**</td>
<td>No significance, but higher SIS confirmed Ph: C, O when resources are small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant but not linear</td>
<td>(Correlation unclear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>G<strong>Tu</strong></td>
<td>G: P, O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey (and Philippines)</td>
<td>Significant but not linear (Correlation unclear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’l Gov’t Subsidy</td>
<td>No significance found</td>
<td>C: NP, O/Tu: O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: same as TABLE 3.

**IV. Political Activism Hypothesis**

Since we cannot find the relationships between resources and SIS, we will now focus on CSOs’ various activities.

As Table 5 shows, 8 activity variables of CSOs are expected to show quite strong correlations with SIS in each country and sector. Among others, these variables include: contact with political parties; support election campaign, influence budget formation; contact mass media, and lobbying (general).

On the other hand, the relationship between country SIS and each variable could be linear or non-linear. We have picked up those that showed linear relations only, or those that are correlated and maybe able to make causal inference. 5 figures (Figure 6-1 to Figure 6-5) are then created.
### TABLE 5. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Activities and Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Name: Ph/R/G/K/J/C/Tu</th>
<th>Sectors: P,NP,C,O</th>
<th>Linearity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Governments</td>
<td>R: P,NP,C/T: O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact National</td>
<td>R<strong>G</strong>K<strong>J</strong>C**</td>
<td>G: P,NP,C/O/J: P,NP,C,O</td>
<td>Semi-Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>R: P,NP,C/T: P,O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Non-linear)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning El.</td>
<td>Ph<strong>J</strong>C<strong>Tu</strong></td>
<td>G: C/J: P,NP</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>/T: NP,O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R: P,NP,C/T: O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Formulation</td>
<td>Ph<strong>R</strong>G<strong>K</strong>J<strong>C</strong>Tu**</td>
<td>Ph: C/G: NP,C,O/K: NP/J: P,NP,O/C: C,O</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Performance</td>
<td>R: P,NP,C/T: NP,C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Bloking/Revising</td>
<td>R<strong>G</strong>K<strong>J</strong>C<strong>Tu</strong></td>
<td>Ph: C/G: NP,C,O/J: P,NP,O/C: C</td>
<td>Semi-Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Performance</td>
<td>R: P,NP,C/T: NP,C,O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Same as TABLE 3.
Figure 6-1. Relation between Political Lobby and SIS (mean)

Figure 6-2. Relation between Media Lobby and SIS (mean)
Figure 6-3. Relation between Campaign Activities and SIS(mean)

Figure 6-4. Relation between Policy Performance (Formulation) and SIS (mean)
Let us examine 5 scatter diagrams. These are relatively speaking, strong linear relations that also show significant correlations between SIS (mean) in each country and variables. We do not conduct multivariate analysis here, but the fact that (more than) 3 out of 8 variables (activities) examined, and 2 variables related to policy performance suggest that these variables show strong relationship with SIS.

The first three variables are:

- **Lobby the Administration through Politicians (Political Lobby)**
- **Provide Information to the Mass Media (Media Lobby)**
- **Participate in Election Campaigns (Campaign Activities) (5 types)**

Each variable indicates aggressive activities toward the government, the mass media, and political parties.

As for political lobby (Figure 6-1), China and Turkey are outliers in the lower right. As for the media lobby (Figure 6-2), the Philippines, and in campaign activities (Figure 6-3), Germany are clearly an outlier in the upper left. It is interesting to note that these suggest the characteristics of the relations between CSOs in each country and political actors.

As a result of these aggressive activities, performance variables (policy formulation
and policy blocking/revising) show clear correlations (Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5). In both instances, the Philippines is somewhat an outlier. Except for the Philippines, we find that the larger the proportion of organizations successful in formulating, revising, and blocking policies, the higher the SIS. SIS in the Philippines is high although there is no evidence of activities or policy performances examined here.

Let us go back to Table 5.

Every country seems to show statistical significance in the chi-square test in each sector, but if we look closer, countries can be divided into two or three groups.

The following is the number of variables that showed significance at a national level:

**Japan 10 variables, Germany 9 variables, South Korea 9 variables, China 9 variables, Russia 8 variables, Turkey 5 variables, and the Philippines 4 variables.**

As for sectors:

**Japan 10 variables, 34 sectors, Germany 10 variables, 25 sectors, Turkey 9 variables, 17 sectors, Russia 8 variables, 23 sectors, South Korea, 6 variables, 8 sectors, China 5 variables, 11 sectors, and the Philippines 3 variables, 6 sectors.**

For example, according to the cross-tabulation analysis, the relationships between policy success and SIS are statistically significant, although the level varies according to countries. The relationships were especially clear in the case of Germany, Japan, and China, while slightly weaker in South Korea and the Philippines, and even weaker in Turkey and Russia (significant probability of chi-square test). When each sector is examined, we find statistical significance in Germany and Japan, but the significance is generally lower in other countries.\(^{11}\)

As the quantitative summary suggests, in established liberal democratic systems like Japan and Germany, the relationships between lobbying and influence are clear at national and sector levels. In other countries, statistical significance declines especially in sectors. It tendency is found not just in Russia, Turkey, China, and the Philippines, but also in South Korea. The level of the maturity in the political processes, which has liberal democratic characteristics, between developed and developing countries may reflect these differences.

\(^{11}\) In Germany, we find statistical significance in the nonprofit, citizen, and other sectors, and in Japan, profit, nonprofit, and other sectors. On the other hand, statistical significance was confirmed only in two sectors in Russia (profit and citizen), South Korea (nonprofit and others), China (other [federation] and citizen [academic and culture]), and Turkey (nonprofit and citizen).
V. Administration Connection Hypothesis

Organizations’ relationships with the administration includes many issues: accrediting, licensing, administrative guidance, policy-formation cooperation, opinion exchange, sending advisory board member, post offering to the ex-bureaucrats, and so on (Table 6).

The relationships between the national administration and SIS in each country suggest that there are no liner relations, and show some negative relations (Figure 7-1). The relations with local autonomies show positive but weak relations (Figure 7-2).

We found weak liner relationships between administrative consultations and SIS, but the Philippine case was an outlier. In other words, we expect that institutional relationships with the administration would be a dilemma for CSOs’ influence. The closer a CSO is to the administration, the lower the SIS.

| TABLE 6. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Relations with Administration |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Country that showed significance in Cross-Tabulation | Sector that showed in respective country | Linearity |
| (Ph89.1%; R60.0%; G28.9%; K91.7%; J74.9%; C94.1%; Tu97.7%) | | |
| (Ph24.5%; R52.1%; G30.0%; K40.7%; J33.0%; C30.3%; Tu14.8%) | | |
| (Ph24.5%; R52.1%; G30.0%; K40.7%; J33.0%; C30.3%; Tu14.8%) | | |

Notes: same as TABLE 3.
Figure 7-1. Relation between Administration Connection (national) and SIS (mean)

Figure 7-2. Relation between Administration Connection (local) and SIS (mean)
Conclusion

This paper first of all emphasizes that our international JIGS survey is a very important and rare project because it comprehensively surveys CSOs themselves directly, which is the most essential element of civil society, in 10 countries. This paper uses data from capital cities in 7 countries, and analyzes the Subjective Influence Scores (SIS mean and SIS in each country) in different sectors.

The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. (See Appendix B for the summary of country analysis.)

First, we argue that the Civil Society Structure Hypothesis is valid. In other words, we can infer that the proportion of the citizen sector may determine each country’s SIS. The citizen sector’s SIS is not necessarily the highest in every country, but it helps raise the overall country SIS.

Second, we argue that the Resource Hypothesis is invalid. We could not find meaningful relations between organizational resources and SIS. This is because countries where CSOs had not enough resources (the Philippines and Russia) scored higher SIS than countries where the proportion of permanent CSOs is relatively large (Japan, Germany, South Korea). At the same time, SIS is low in countries where most organizations are new, and had not enough resources (China and Turkey). The citizen sector is relatively new in most countries. In particular, organizations established during the transitional period tended to evaluate themselves more positively, and that is why they had higher SIS.

Third, as for the relationship between lobbying and SIS, there is an overall correlation which is a result of activism, and the relationships between policy preference and SIS are also strong. Moreover, we found differences (statistical significance) between mature liberal democracies like Japan and Germany, and others in their relations to SIS. When each sector is analyzed, correlations often become obvious, but no clear significance was found in the cases of South Korea, China, and the Philippines. This may be related to institutional maturity of liberal democracy.12

Fourth, administrative connections, like activism, showed some correlations with SIS. However, in terms of liner relations with SIS in each country, we were able to find such relations, although weak, with local autonomy and administrative consultation, but not with the state (national government). We assume that there is a complex relationship among the state, CSOs, and SIS.

Theoretically speaking, each country’s SIS, which maybe determined by the number

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12 More puzzles can be found here. For example, why did we find higher level of significance than expected in Turkey and Russia?
of citizen sector’s proportion to other sectors, can be considered as an indicator of civil society’s influence. This indicator can also be considered to show aggressiveness of civil society as it affects (or is affected by) CSO activism and performance.

The remaining tasks are the following. First, we need to take into consideration the relative strength of other actors surrounding CSOs such as the state, enterprises, family, and religious organizations (See Tsujinaka ed.2002, and Shigetomi 2004). We were not able to analyze these in our study, but we surmise that in a society where the citizen sector is relatively dominant, the strength of the state and the government may be weak. On the other hand, in a society where for-profit sector organizations are relatively dominant, the state and the government may be strong. This may explain why SIS in the Philippines and Russia are higher than that of Germany, South Korea, and Japan’s. It may also explain why SIS in Turkey and China are low. There is no denying that SIS is an indicator of state determinism and the relative relations with the state (similarly firms, family, religious organizations.) As for Russia, Turkey, and China, we need to explore these issues further in the future.

As mentioned above, the analysis of year established reflects the changes in political systems (regimes). Moreover, SIS may be high if newly emerging organizations feel a strong sense of historical accomplishment in affecting state-society relationships.

New organizations do not have enough resources and that may be a negative factor for their activities, but their aspirations to become more influential could work as a plus. Such dynamism of newly emerging organizations need to be examined in relations to other actors as well. This will be our future research topic.
## Appendix A. Classification of Four Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector 1</th>
<th>Sector 2</th>
<th>Sector 3</th>
<th>Sector 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
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... (continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>タイトル</td>
<td>サブタイトル</td>
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<td>シリーズ1</td>
<td>タイトル1</td>
<td>サブタイトル1</td>
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<td>シリーズ2</td>
<td>タイトル2</td>
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<td>タイトル3</td>
<td>サブタイトル3</td>
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<tr>
<td>シリーズ4</td>
<td>タイトル4</td>
<td>サブタイトル4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注: 本文中のテキストは日本語であり、内容は具体的な情報が含まれています。
Appendix B. The Supplementary Summary of Country Analysis

The following is a brief summary of each country’s characteristics in the JIGS survey. We will start from a country that scored the highest SIS (mean).

1) **The Philippines**: The Philippines scores highest in SIS (mean) than any other countries. About 50 percent of all the organizations are in the citizen sector as in the case of Russia. SIS of the citizen sector is the lowest of all the four sectors examined in the Philippines. However, when it is compared to that of other countries, the citizen sector SIS is the highest. The proportion of the profit sector is the smallest in all the countries surveyed. Some organizations in the profit sector were established in the late 1980s. Organizations in the citizen sector, on the other hand, were mostly established in recent years. We find that some new and small citizen sector organizations had high SIS. Relations were confirmed between SIS on the one hand and political activities such as election campaigns, lobbying, and policy performance on the other. However, when these relations are compared to that of other countries’, SIS and those activities do not show strong relations. Moreover, while the relationships between organizations and the administrations seem to be expanding, consultations have not increased. We infer that the organizations in the citizen sector, especially newly emerging ones, feel that they are influential because of the momentum and vigor they have. But generally speaking, we find weak relations between the amount of activities and SIS. The subjective foundation of their influence is also weak. The reasons may be weak relations with other actors, and especially Philippine’s “weak state (government).”

2) **Russia**: Russia scores the second highest SIS (mean). The citizen sector covers 50 percent, nonprofit 40 percent, and the profit sector, only 10 percent of all the organizations. Domestically, SIS of the citizen sector ranks bottom among the four, but internationally, the score is the second highest. In general, many organizations, including profit and citizen, were established in the 1990s, and we assume that the impact of the political system (regime) change was quite significant. We find some new citizen organizations that have a high SIS. In terms of the relationships between SIS and organizations’ activities, lobbying, and policy performance, we find that Russia’s score was about the same as that of Japan and Germany’s. The relationship between activities and SIS, hence, is much higher than we had expected. Organizations’ relationships with the administrations have expanded to some extent, and their activities concerning consultation is the most active of all the
countries surveyed. We infer that the newly emerging organizations in the citizen and nonprofit sectors are very active, and feel that they are influential. Institutionalization is also progressing to some extent. The pattern of CSO influence in Russia turned out to be very similar to that of the developed countries’ than we had expected. (However, the caveat is that in this particular survey, the population was relatively small, and it is possible that the data of only elite-type powerful organizations were captured.)

3) **Germany**: Germany scores the third highest SIS (mean). The nonprofit sector was the largest and covers one third, and the citizen and other sectors cover less than 30 percent of the organizations. The size of the profit sector is less than 10 percent, but the SIS is the highest both domestically and internationally. The SIS of the citizen sector is unexpectedly the lowest. In terms of the year established, many organizations in the profit sector were created right after the Second World War, and as for the citizen sector, in the 1990s. We find two peak waves, reflecting two political system (regime) changes in the postwar and when the unification took place. Many organizations established after WWII have a high SIS. Except for campaign activities, we find clear relations between SIS and activities, lobbying, and policy performance, and strong relations between activities and SIS. Organizations’ relations with the administration (national) were the weakest. Instead, the relations with local autonomy and the administration (policy consultations) are somewhat more pervasive. Overall, the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are strong and clear, and Germany’s country SIS is high among developed states. We infer that various organization in all 4 sectors, especially those in the profit sector, are feeling their influence through vigorous activities. Moreover, German organizations are not active in elections campaigns and have weak relations with the state. We surmise that German CSOs are independent from political parties and the administration, and that there is a dividing line between civil society and political society.

4) **South Korea**: South Korea has the fourth highest SIS (mean), but the score was below 2.0, which is equivalent to “Somewhat Influential.” The proportion of the nonprofit sector was the largest with 40 percent, and the rest was 20 percent each. SIS of the citizen sector was the highest in South Korea. Many organizations were established after the 1980s, but as for the profit sector, there is another peak in the 1960s. Overall, this shows that the 1987 liberalization had quite dynamic effects. Except for election campaigning, SIS and activities, lobbying, and policy blocking show clear relations in South Korea. However, when examined sector by sector, the relations
generally become extremely ambiguous. (For example, the relationships between SIS and the following variables are unclear: lobbying the administration through politicians, contacting the administration, election campaign, and policy blocking). On the other hand, the relations between organizations and the administration both at national and local levels as well as consultations with these administrations have been quite strong. Overall, the amount of activities and SIS do not show clear relations. We infer that SIS in South Korea is about average. The data suggests strong relations between SIS and the administration, but not so between SIS and various sectors. This precarious pattern is similar to that of China’s.

5) **Japan**: Japan ranks fifth, and has a rather low SIS (mean). The profit sector has the largest proportion (one third) and this is the largest among the developed countries. The citizen sector, however, is the smallest with 13 percent. Although the citizen sector is the smallest, SIS is the highest among all the sectors in Japan. Japan shows a unique pattern because many organizations were established since the end of WWII war until the 1960s. Many profit organizations were established right after the war until the 1960s, and citizen organizations between the 1970 and 80s. These trends clearly suggest political system (regime) change in the postwar Japan. We find that many organizations established within 10 years since the end of WWII show high SIS. Also we find very clear relations between all activities, lobbying, and policy performance on the one hand, and SIS (both national and sector levels) on the other, thus strong relations between activities and SIS. The relationships between SIS and the administration are confirmed but only to some extent both at national and local levels. Consultations with the administration are also increasing to some extent. Overall, the relationships between the level of activities and SIS are strong and clear, but at the same time, it is low compared to other developed countries. We conclude that active organizations in the four sectors feel they are influential, but when the level of activities is low, they do not feel so. One important characteristic in the Japanese case is that the relationships between activism and SIS are evident in all sectors.

6) **China**: China ranks sixth in SIS (mean) and scored 1.0 which suggests, “Not (or hardly) Influential.” The target in the China survey was “social organizations” and the profit sector (or “Industry” because sector classifications are different in China,) was the largest with 40 percent, and the rest (“Professional,” “Academic/Culture,” and “Federations”) constitutes 20 percent each. The profit sector has the higher SIS in China. As for the year established, the trend is generally similar to that of Russia and the Philippines’ where many were established since the 1990s. Academic
organizations (C) have been increasing since the 1970s. Except for budget activities, the relations between activities, lobbying, policy performance, and SIS are very much clear. However, when each sector is examined, relations become quite ambiguous (for example, in “lobby the administration through politicians,” “contact the administration,” “election campaign,” and “budget lobbying”). As for the relations with the administration (national and local), consultations have very much advanced. Overall, **the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are not quite clear (This result is similar to the South Korean case).** We conclude that SIS is low, but show strong relations with the administration. Moreover, we could not find clear relationship between activities and sectors. We also need to note that China was not once an outlier in various analyses (However, we targeted social organizations, hence, it is possible that only organizations that have a strong relations with the administration have answered.)

7) **Turkey:** Turkey has the lowest SIS (mean) among all the countries surveyed. “Other” turned out to be the largest sector, occupying nearly 60 percent (many are regional solidarity associations). Both profit and citizen sectors are smaller than 10 percent. SIS of the profit sector is the highest of all the sectors in Turkey. Many are established since the latter half of the 1980s. As for profit organizations, many are established in the 1980s, but generally scattered evenly throughout the postwar era, and organizations in the citizen sector are mostly established in recent years. The relationships between activities (lobby the administration through politicians, election campaign, and lobbying, policy blocking) and SIS in Turkey are weak. However, when each sector is examined, we can confirm relations in almost all variables, as was the case in Japan and Germany. As for the relationships with the administration, Turkish organizations have quite strong connections, while consultations with the administration have not progressed. Generally speaking, **the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are quite strong.** We conclude that although the overall SIS is low, the relations between SIS and the administration are strong. We also found that the relations between activities and performances and SIS in sectors are as clear as the cases in Germany and Japan. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Turkey was never an outlier in any of the cross-tabulation analyses conducted.
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